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The Ideology of Microfoundations
For more than fifty years, economic pedagogy has been structured around the division between macroeconomics and microeconomics. Virtually every undergraduate economics major and graduate student begins his course of study with core classes in these two fields. Yet, in the conceptual schema of professional economistssurprisingly, perhaps, especially among macroeconomists -macroeconomics occupies an equivocal place.
The typical concerns of macroeconomics -such as national output, employment and unemployment, inflation, interest rates, and the balance of payments -are among the oldest in economics, having been dominant among the problems addressed by both the mercantilists, and classical economists, such as David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, as well as even earlier writers. These concerns co-existed with ones that we now regard as characteristically microeconomic, such the theory of prices exemplified in the labor theory of value of the classical economists or the theory of marginal utility of the early neoclassical economists. Questions about the relationship between these two groups of concerns could hardly be articulated until a categorical distinction between macroeconomics and microeconomics had been drawn.
Although the word "macroeconomics" was coined (probably by Ragnar Frisch) several years before and although John Maynard Keynes did not himself use the term, the category of macroeconomics entered the consciousness of economists as a result of the publication of Keynes's General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (1936) . 1 "Macroeconomics" is used in at least two senses. First, Keynes (1936, pp. 292-293) contrasted economic analysis that assumed that aggregate output was fixed and addressed 1 On Frisch's use of "macroeconomics," see Fittoussi and Velupillai (1993) . "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 2 the decisions of individual firms or workers and analysis that explained output as a whole, as opposed to the output of a particular firm. Second, macroeconomics has also been viewed simply as the economics of aggregate quantities -of GDP rather than cars, of the unemployment rate rather than the hiring decision, of the inflation rate rather than the price of Coca-Cola. These two characterizations of macroeconomics are different but not necessarily contrary. The interplay between them, indeed, explains some of the issues that arise in macroeconomics.
Once a distinction had been drawn -whether or not it was a crisp one -the question of the relationship between microeconomics and macroeconomics was immediately on the table (see Hoover 2002) . Wassily Leontieff (1936) , in one of the earliest responses to the General Theory, attacked it for its inconsistency with a microeconomic account of general equilibrium. The Keynesian Lawrence Klein (1950, ch. 3 and pp. 192-199) saw the provision of microeconomic foundations for each of the main Keynesian "functions" (consumption, investment, and money demand) as part of the essential agenda of the Keynesian revolution.
Keynes himself analyzed the individual behavior that he took to lie behind these functions. Yet, he also thought about how the behavior of the individual related to aggregate variables. For instance, Keynes's (1936, pp. 169-172) account of the speculative demand for money depended on the individual's assessment of whether current interest rates are below or above the rate that he subjectively regards as normal.
Individuals plunge into money when rates are below normal, since any return to normal implies a capital loss on holdings of interest-bearing bonds; while they plunge into bonds when rates are above normal in pursuit of the implied capital gain. Keynes argued that a "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 3 smooth curve -rather than the knife-edge behavior of the individual -should relate aggregate money holdings inversely to interest rates, since subjective judgments about the "normal" interest rate vary among individuals. 2 That economists had to think carefully about the differences between individual and aggregate behavior was once an article of faith and was clearly encapsulated into elementary textbooks (for example, in Samuelson's (1948) pathbreaking Principles of Economics) with reference to fallacies of composition. Yet seventy years after the publication of the General Theory, the reigning ideology of macroeconomists is that macroeconomics is secondary to microeconomics. Reflecting a common feature of ideologies, adherents of the reigning ideology have a variety of understandings of in what exactly the secondariness of macroeconomics consists and different degrees of allegiance to the ideology itself.
At least three broadly reductionist views of the relationship of macroeconomics to microeconomics are commonly encountered.
One view holds that there is no useful distinction between macroeconomics and
microeconomics. This is encapsulated in Robert Lucas (1987, pp. 107-108) desire to eliminate the distinction altogether.
2. A second holds defines macroeconomics not by its methods or its conceptual scheme, which are no different from those of microeconomics, but by the range of problems to which it is addressed -for example, to monetary and fiscal policy.
On this view, macroeconomics is distinct from other subfields in the same way "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 4 that, say, industrial organization is distinct from labor economics, while both are subfields of microeconomics.
3. A third view does admit different methods and approaches, but sees macroeconomics as only a pragmatic compromise with the complexity of applying microeconomics to economy-wide problems. This view asserts that macroeconomics reduces to microeconomics in principle but, because the reduction is difficult, we are not there yet.
These three views all contribute to the widespread belief that sound macroeconomics stands in need of "microfoundations."
In referring to microfoundations for macroeconomics as an ideology, I use ideology both in the neutral sense of a more or less coherent set of beliefs guiding the collective activity of macroeconomic research and in its pejorative sense of false consciousness -a collective illusion shared by macroeconomists. My contention is that, even in its neutral sense, the ideology of microfoundations rests on a mistake about the ontology of the social world; while, in its pejorative sense, it shares the characteristic, common to political ideologies, of serving as a tool of persecution and intellectual repression. The ideologue searches for ideological purity. Since the consciousness is false, ideology in this sense is bound to be a muddle -but a deeply pernicious muddle.
The adherents of views 1 or 2 frequently also hold view 3 as well. And view 3 underwrites a kind of tyranny of the future, which is typical of totalitarian politics: a vision of heaven on earth justifies any misdeed today as long as it aims towards the future good, even when the path between the here-and-now and the future is obscure. I have elsewhere referred to this trope as eschatological justification . "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics"
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The reductionist impulse in macroeconomics is frequently referred to as methodological individualism. The term is not apt. Practical macroeconomics does not consist of true microeconomic models -that is, of models in which the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates is derived from the composition of the behaviors of individual economic actors. This would obviously be a very difficult way to approach the economy, posing problems of a similar nature to trying to explain the formation of hurricanes molecule by molecule, applying the established principles of Newtonian mechanics.
In practice, macroeconomists generally accept the representative-agent model as a workable microfoundation. The representative-agent model takes economywide aggregates (GDP and its components, price indices, average interest rates, and so forth) as if they were the equivalent to the similarly named variables associated with individual agents (the incomes of individual workers, the products of individual firms, the prices of those products, the interest rates at which an individual borrows, and so forth). The representative agent is just a microeconomic agent writ large. He maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint given by the national-income identity. He simultaneously maximizes profits subject to an aggregate production function. And the form of these functions is identical to the forms that have proved tractable in microeconomic analysis. "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 6 would be extraordinary for the macroeconomy to conform to Cobb-Douglas functional forms with aggregate consumption, GDP, capital, and labor as their arguments. 4 Once we recognize that representative-agent models do not deal with individuals, we see that macroeconomics mimics the forms of microeconomics without successfully implementing an individualist methodology. This is so obvious that one must wonder in what the attraction of microeconomic forms consists. I conjecture that the real underlying motivation is not methodological but ontological. The ontological mistake of macroeconomics is to believe that the objects of macroeconomic analysis are not ontologically independent. Macroeconomists fear that they are not dealing with solid economic entities unless they can trace the route along which those entities reduce ontologically to individual decision-makers. But, since this is an impracticable task, they emphasis the connection of the aggregate to the individual by aping the analytical forms of microeconomics.
The fears and strategies of economic reductionism are, then, quite different from those in other sciences. Biologists, for example, are deeply afraid of functional or teleological explanations. They are not happy with explanations that rely on anything that attributes beliefs, goals, or other intentional states to individual organism, much less to species. In contrast, the economist finds it hard to see any analysis as "economic" unless it deals in intentional states. The point of microfoundations is to recapture the teleology that appeared to be missing in macroeconomics.
A successful ontology of macroeconomics must recognize the fear that motivates the program of microfoundations. Macroeconomists are, of course, correct that there is an important sense in which macroeconomic behavior must emerge from microeconomic "Microfoundations and (Hoover 1995; 2001a, ch. 3; 2001b, ch. 5) . I argued that macroeconomics supervened on microeconomics. That is, while the conceptual structure of microeconomics and macroeconomics were distinct, any particular arrangement of microeconomic features would always generate exactly the same set of macroeconomic arrangements.
Supervenience is usually regarded as a form of weak reductionism that aims to preserve the fundamental object of reduction of the macro to micro. For example, philosophers of mind who want to reduce the mental to the physical while recognizing that there is a gap between mental and physical concepts appeal to supervenience (Kim 1978) . But just, as I previously noted, biologists seek reductions to purge their subject of intentionality while economists seek reductions to recapture intentionality, as an economist I sought to use supervenience in an anti-reductionist manner. The goal was not to reduce macroeconomics to microeconomics, but to show that macroeconomics could have an ontological anchor in the individual, while preserving ontological "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 8 independence for causally interacting aggregates. The central idea was that, in moving from the microeconomic to the macroeconomic, we do not preserve, in Uskali Mäki's (1996) evocative term, the "ontic furniture" of the microeconomic world. The conceptual shift, I argued, was evident in the units of measurement. The price of goods has the dimension of dollars/unit of good; while the general price level, which is often thought to be analogous to a microeconomic price, has the dimension of current period dollars per base-period dollar. Similarly, a real good has a physical unit, while the supposedly analogous macroeconomic quantity, real GDP, has only a monetary unit (base perioddollars) My argument, then, was that macroeconomic aggregates could be seen as emergent properties of the macroeconomy -ones that would not exist without the underlying microeconomic agents -but ones that, like mental properties emerging from physical properties -were ontologically distinct. But why should this relationship not be regarded as a specie of reduction? Why should this distinction not be merely conceptual rather than ontological? In particular, why should we not just view the macroeconomic agents as (rather imperfect) summaries of the microeconomic data? Why should we regard them as "real" in the sense of existing externally (i.e., independently of any individual human mind) and objectively (i.e., unconstituted by the representations of macroeconomic theory) (see Hoover 1995, p. 236; 2001b, p. 109) .
One argument against reduction of macroeconomics to microeconomics extends a David Levy's (1985) argument that microeconomic actors necessarily employ macroeconomic concepts in their decision making. For example, anyone trying to calculate how much to put aside for their children's education needs to form expectations of the course of inflation, where inflation is a macroeconomic concept. Since these "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 9 macroeconomic concepts are not those of an outsider who is observing and summarizing the microeconomic facts, but are those of individual agents who are making the microeconomic facts, it would seem like macroeconomic concepts are, in fact, constitutive of parts of microeconomic reality. A reductionist use of supervenience requires that the microeconomic and the macroeconomic belong to separate domains, but here they cannot be separated.
In addition to this argument against reductionism, I also tried to give positive arguments for the external reality of macroeconomic aggregates. First, I applied Ian Hacking's (1983, pp. 22-24 ) manipulability criterion -"if you can spray them [i.e., electrons], then they are real" -to macroeconomics. A positive example of such a manipulation is the Federal Reserve's use of controlled movements in one macroeconomic aggregate, the real interest rate, to manipulate another, the yield curve.
Second, I argued that the strategy of idealization in the construction of scientific models (see Nowak 1980 and Hoover 1994) can be successful empirically only if the models isolate the essential primary factors involved in causal processes. The success of an idealized model, therefore, amounts to an argument in favor of the existence of these primary factors. All successful macroeconomics, including any successful representative-agent models, trade entirely in macroeconomic aggregates. Despite their microeconomic trappings, the claims that representative-agent models are successful amount to implicit claims for the existence of macroeconomic aggregates. And pace Rosenberg (1992), I believe economics generally, and macroeconomics particularly, to have substantial empirical success. "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics"
A CRITIQUE OF SUPERVENIENCE
Julian Reiss (2004) argues that supervenience provides a poor framework for understanding the micro-macro relationship in a realist ontology of macroeconomics. He argues, first, that the classic applications of supervenience are reductionist and require that the concepts at the micro and macro levels be disjoint. An anti-reductionist twist to a supervenience argument, particularly one that argues that macroeconomic concepts are employed at the microeconomic level, is misguided to the point of triviality. All that is left of the original notion is that the there is a determinate many-to-one relationship between the individual and the aggregate, in which the same configuration of individual elements always fix the configuration of aggregate elements, although more than one configuration of individual elements might fix the same configuration of aggregate elements.
In part, Reiss's objection is that no one fails to accept that the macroeconomic behavior is ultimately the product of microeconomic behavior. He elaborates the objection, however, by challenging the ability of the microeconomic to fix the macroeconomic. He does so by appealing to Levy's observation that microeconomic agents use macroeconomic concepts. In particular, if agents use a price index to calculate real quantities or inflation rates that are salient in their individual decision-making and if, as is perfectly clear, there is no uniquely correct price index, then, the same set of background microeconomic facts, might lead agents to make different decisions, depending on which price index they use, and consequently generate a different set of macroeconomic facts. "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 11 Reiss's argument that supervenience is inapplicable is offered constructively, in the sense that he supports a realist macroeconomic ontology and finds that an appeal to supervenience is a distraction that weakens the argument. Reiss misprizes the supervenience argument because he underestimates the ontological fears of macroeconomists. The lesson of the Lucas (1976) critique of macroeconometric models is that estimated relationships are stable in the face of changing policy and, therefore, useful in policy analysis only when they capture the "deep parameters" of the economy, which we can appropriately translate into the "fundamental ontological building blocks of the economy." Lucas's assumption is that these deep parameters are necessarily microeconomic. The only way to calm the ontological fears of macroeconomists is to demonstrate that macroeconomic aggregates can stand in relationships governed by deep parameters without being severed from the microeconomic, for it is precisely the view that aggregates are not tightly connected to individual decision-makers that drives the microfoundational ideology. Supervenience was offered as a balm -one way of clarifying that macroeconomic aggregates could be causally autonomous without becoming disconnected from individual behavior.
Reiss claims that the multiplicity of aggregation schemes (e.g., multiple price indices) undermines the supervenience account in the sense that he denies that the exact same micro facts must generate the exact same macro facts. The argument appears to be that, since the same micro facts can support different price aggregation schemes and each can be used to generate a different measure of inflation, then the micro facts have not "fixed" the macro facts about inflation. But this argument seems to hinge on the conflation of the measuring instrument with the thing measured and to appeal to a limited "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics"
12 view of what constitutes the micro facts. Inflation as a category is something that we might measure through different schemes. One may be better than another and, yet, neither perfect at capturing our theoretical conception. The claim about micro fixing macro is not about any particular imperfect measure, but about the object of measurement. The diversity of aggregate measures does not address the point at issue.
Further, even if the measures themselves disagree (inflation on the CPI is 3 percent per year, while on the GDP deflator it is only 1.5 percent per year), once we know what the measuring schemes are, they are still all fixed by the micro arrangements.
If a particular micro configuration delivers CPI of 3 percent and GDP deflator of 1.5 percent, any repetition of that configuration would also deliver those same values. The values of these and other measures may all differ, but they differ in the same way for the same set of micro arrangements. And the distribution of assessments of macroeconomic quantities among different individuals is one of the pertinent microeconomic facts. It is only when we conceive of this distribution as not among the fixed facts that Reiss's argument gets any traction.
While Reiss underestimates the vital importance of meeting the ontological fears of macroeconomists, he may be correct that the effort to meet those fears with a nonreductive supervenience account is so alien to established usage that the term "supervenience" ought to be dropped. The point that macroeconomics can be causally autonomous without slipping its microeconomic moorings remains important nonetheless.
In retrospect, the argument that macroeconomic concepts are fundamentally involved at the microeconomic level may be too weak to support the status of "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 13 macroeconomics. It may mistake an epistemological problem for an ontological one.
Yes, any account of microeconomic behavior must recognize that individuals need to use aggregate concepts as a means of dealing with the complexity of the environments in which they make decisions. Consequently, there are no useful accounts of the microeconomic that do not involve aggregate variables. This can be true, however, without these variables existing independently of the representations of the individuals.
The first step in my attempt to establish the external reality of macroeconomic aggregates was to establish the independence of the conceptual framework of macroeconomics from that of microeconomics. To the degree that this was established through dimensional analysis of micro and macroeconomic quantities, it now seems to rest on too weak a reed. The same issue arises, for example, in the relationship between microphysical and macrophysical quantities -say the relationship between the momenta of molecules in a gas and the pressure as it figures in the ideal gas laws. The social elements in economics are relational facts among individuals. In order to derive the ideal gas laws, the kinetic theory of gases makes use of deeply relational facts, namely, the assume probability distribution of the momenta of the underlying molecules. Physicists tend to overlook the manner in which the assumption of a probability distribution adds a super-individual element into an erstwhile reductionist enterprise. Analogously, reductionist economics leaves out the characteristically social elements of economics.
The question is, then, whether we can provide a richer, but still intelligible account of the connection between the individual and the aggregate, which incorporates the specifically social features of economics. "Microfoundations and the Ontology of An example shows how familiar this picture is to economists, as well as suggesting that there might be alternatives. Roger Guesnerie (1992 Guesnerie ( , p. 1254 ) divides the justifications of the rational-expectations hypothesis into two types -eductive and evolutive. "Eductive explanations rely on the understanding of the logic of the situation by economic agents; they are explicitly or implicitly associated with the mental activity of participants aiming at 'forecasting the forecasts of others'." Eductive rational expectations are the expectations of human molecules whose intentional states are radically isolated from the intentional states of others. In contrast, "[e]volutive explanations put emphasis on the learning possibilities offered by the repetition of the situation; they are associated with the study of convergence or more or less ad hoc learning processes." The important point for us is not the adhocness of the learning processes but the public nature of what is learned. Forming expectations on the basis of inductions about the process governing, say, prices puts little weight on an individual's intentional states and is, in principle, intersubjective. An eductive rational expectation is my own belief; an evolutive rational expectation is an attempt to characterize a fact in the world and could be something that I read in the newspaper. Even if I were to publish my belief, by the time that it is in print, it simply becomes an additional piece of information on which the holders of eductive rational expectations will ply their forecasting logic.
In opposition to the strictly individual intentionality of eductive rationalexpectations, Searle tries to make sense of collective intentionality. As well as "I believe" or "I intend," Searle argues that the states that "we believe" or "we intend" are part of the mental repertoire of every individual. The choice is not between strict reductionism and an untethered Hegelian spirit. Rather individuals can possess individual or collective intentions, and collective action is one human possibility.
For example, when Exxon bought Mobile Oil, this was not an individual action in which the CEO's intentional state was "I intend to buy and believe that the chief financial officer and other parties intend to buy," and so for each relevant party. Instead, the intentional state of the CEO and the other parties was "we (i.e., Exxon) intend to buy."
The intentions remain in the mind of each individual -no supermind is invoked. It is just that each individual intends to act collectively. The operative pronoun is "we," not "I. Searle rejects the notion of collective action as the complex outcome of the interactions of atomic intentionality -a form of intentionality for which eductive rational expectations provides a paradigm. First, while collective social facts exist only as the result of representations in some individual minds, typically no single mind is necessary or sufficient for their existence. In that sense, they are not subjective, but are experienced as objective facts not dissimilar to the facts about physical objects. Social objects (e.g., governments, money, or universities) are "placeholders for patterns of activities" (Searle 1995, p. 57) . Collective intentionality is about ongoing activities and the possibility of more. The independence of the collective level from particular individuals is also mirrored in physical sciences. Putnam (1975) argues that many physical explanations work only at a macro level. Why is it, for instance, that a square peg 15/16 inches on a side will pass through a square hole 1 inch on a side but not through a round hole 1 inch in diameter? The answer appeals to the microstructures of the peg and the board in which the holes are cut only to the degree that, whatever those structures are, they imply that the peg and board are rigid. No microanalysis can explain in any general and, therefore, scientific manner, what is easily understood on the basis of macro-level geometry.
Batterman (2001) uses a case study of rainbows to argue that scientific explanation quite "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" commonly relies on higher level relationships that are indifferent to most of the fine details of the underlying microstructures.
Searle's second point is that the rules constitutive of social facts form a background, which is not maintained by conscious (or unconscious) intentions. A tyro baseball player may intend with each of his actions to follow the rules of baseball, but an experienced player simply intends various actions within the context of the gamebunting or stealing a base, for example. While the experienced player may be described as following the rules of the game, because his behavior conforms to the rules, he need not constantly intend to do so. The background framework of constitutive rules, not maintained by intentional states, accounts for the inert objectivity of social facts.
Searle finds many economic examples of social facts that are constructed through collective intentionality -money, for instance. Individual engraved, green pieces of paper are nothing but paper except to the degree that they serve as markers in a set of constitutive rules involved in exchanging goods and storing purchasing power through time. In context, the paper serves as money only to the degree that a sufficient number of people believe that it serves those functions. Because the collective intentions are what give the paper its monetary character, it is also clear that the paper itself is dispensable.
Metal or entries in a bank's computers might also serve as money, provided that people accepted them as markers in the set of constitutive rules. In this sense, money depends on the representations of individuals, but it does not depend on the representations of any particular individual.
Erstwhile paper money could become demonetized if a sufficient number of people ceased to believe that it could serve these monetary functions. Some of the police "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 18 powers associated with state-issued money are aimed at removing the causes (such as counterfeiting) that might undermine people's belief or faith in the monetary character of the money tokens (paper or electronic).
Money, then, is epistemologically objective in that it exists independently of my representations, though not independently of all representations. And it is ontologically subjective -not subjective in the sense of not really existing, but in something more like the sense in which color is subjective. Colors are real; but without observers, light would have a frequency though not a color. Money, as anyone who has found himself "a day late and a dollar short" will attest, exists as a social fact. And while such a social fact depends on our representations and intentional states collectively, one encounters the possibilities of money or the constraints of a lack of money as palpably as one encounters the stone when building a wall or stubbing one's toe.
Again, the literature on the microfoundations of money provides just the contrast case against which Searle argues. Search models of money (e.g., Jones 1976 or Kiyotaki and Wright 1989 seek to explain which objects become money and how they acquire their monetary properties with an appeal exclusively to individual intentionality. In a search model an object becomes monetized through a process of the agent's individually regarding it is valuable, and believing that others also regard it is a valuable, as an intermediate step in trade, one which reduces the expected costs of finding a suitable trading partner. Monetization is, therefore, closely related to the eductive justification of rational expectations in which the expectations are calculated as forecasts of the forecasts of others. Money in such accounts has no intrinsic value or, if it has intrinsic value because it is a real good like gold, its intrinsic value is not essential to its "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 19 monetary character. Rather its monetary character is sustained by all the agents in the economy solving a complex utility maximization problem in which the monetary character of the money good emerges as an equilibrium in which the particular good is the unique (or nearly unique) intermediary in all trades. Search models provide a paradigm for all microfoundational accounts of economic institutions.
Money as an institution is, on the microfoundational account, in need of perpetual intentional maintenance. Its status is fragile and would collapse easily if the optimizers shirked. In arguing that collective intentionality is exercised in a background of constitutive rules, Searle denies that economic institutions must be so persistently maintained by the right intentional states. Searle argues that ordinary economic actions are not the product of rational choice exercised through well ordered preferences, but operations within internalized rules. The institution of money, on this view, need not be perpetually recreated by the decisions of economic agents in the manner of the search models, but can be taken as a given part of the background (objective relative to any particular individual), the context in which, say, individual shoppers decide to buy this or that particular good.
The problem of macroeconomic ontology has two levels. The first is to establish that there are social facts or institutions that ontologically transcend individual economic agents. The second is to establish that the macroeconomic aggregates are examples of such social facts and to determine their character. Searle's account so far addresses the first level. Social institutions are the product of collective intentionality, but they may form only the background that delineates the possibilities and constraints on individual "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 20 actions. Can we use Searle's account to address the second level of the problem of macroeconomic ontology? Searle (1995, pp. 137-147) argues that, besides the mental causation and behaviorism ("billiard ball causation") familiar in much of social science, we should admit a third kind of causation, which recognizes the causal role that the background of constitutive rules plays in determining the actions and outcomes of individuals. 5 The argument amounts to recognizing that, in some cases, the particular intentional actions of individuals are less important to determining outcomes than the constraints that limit their behavior. The well known argument of Becker and Stigler (1977) that, with no reference to utility functions, we know that demand curves must slope down because of the budget constraint illustrates how the background can determine the character of the outcome independent of intentional states. Similarly, Herbert Simon's (1957, part IV, especially chapters 14 and 15) "bounded rationality" is in part driven by the role of constraints.
Heiner (1983) argues that predictable behavior emerges from bounded rationality and background constraints essentially because something like Searle's background dominates individual preferences.
It is a small step to macroeconomic aggregates. Driven by constraints, the behavior of aggregates may sometimes be hardly related to the specific decisions of That it is beside the point in certain sorts of causal analysis to inquire into the behavior of the individuals that constitute the aggregates is why Hoover (1995) In this respect, macroeconomic aggregates are importantly different from physical aggregates. How they relate to one another depends on the collective intentional states of "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 24 underlying individuals, and explains why there are sources of instability in the relationships among economic aggregates not found in the relationships among physical aggregates. This is, of course, the insight behind Lucas (1976) critique of macroeconometric policy analysis. Lucas argued that individual economic agents who understood the role of economic policy would make different choices and, therefore, contribute to different aggregate outcomes as policy rules changed. As a result, the policymaker was not entitled to take the relationships among aggregates as a stable background that could be used reliably to predict the effect of a policy action.
The Lucas critique appears, then, to be compatible with a Searlean account of macroeconomic aggregates. The standard reaction to the Lucas critique, starting with Lucas himself, is to argue, first, that the only way to stabilize the relationships among macroeconomic aggregates is to base the analysis in the causal bedrock of "deep parameters" and, second, that those deep parameters are the ones that govern the tastes and technology of individual economic agents (Lucas 1980, pp. 708-712; cf. Sargent 1981, esp. pp. 233, 242) . The second part of the reaction reflects the ideology of microfoundations and ignores the superindividual quality of economic facts and institutions based in collective intentionality. On the one hand, some of the social features that underwrite economic aggregates may be ones for which the behavior of particular individuals is irrelevant, so that the deepest relevant parameters appear in 
Implications for Applied Macroeconomics
At economists (e.g., Tooke, Jevons) tried to use aggregate data to understand the causal structure of the economic world; yet, economists of the day were frequently skeptical.
John Stuart Mill, for example, gave a detailed account of how to infer causation from "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 26 experimental data with his canons of induction (Mill 1851) , but he regarded the economy as too complex to be dealt with in an experimental manner. For Mill, the method of economics had to be a priori, based on the logic of the economic situation. Since deductions from theory led to conclusions about behavior in isolation from a huge range of complicating factors, they -at best -indicated tendencies of the economy. Economic statistics could illustrate these economic tendencies, but the failure of the data to conform to the theory could not provide evidence against the theory -too many complicating causes might explain away the deviations. Economics, for Mill, was an "inexact and separate science" (cf. Hausman 1992) . Extreme versions of Mill's apriorism are found in such later economists as Robbins (1935) and Mises (1966) . Their vision of economics as the science of the allocation of scarce resources to their optimal uses (optimization subject to constraints) provides the underlying vision of modern microeconomics.
Many 19 th and early 20 th century statisticians and economists also doubted the applicability of statistics to economic data. Such data rarely appeared to conform to the laws of probability: they were not derived from controlled experiments and, when observational, rarely conformed to common probability models. They were, for example, almost never normal and frequently displayed trends or correlations between successive time series observations.
Trygve Haavelmo (1944) initiated the modern period in econometrics with the idea that economic data could be divided into a systematic component (the economics) and an unsystematic component, the residuals. The residuals formed by conditioning the data on its systematic causes could be regarded as a random sample, conforming to the laws of probability, and be subjected to ordinary statistical analysis. The essential "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 27 problem in Haavelmo's account of econometrics was to identify the systematic component. The identification problem had been recognized well before Haavelmo (see Morgan 1990, chapter 6; Hendry and Morgan 1995, section 3) .
Supply and demand provide the classic illustration. Supply depends on price, and demand depends on price; the observed quantity and price are the intersection of the supply and demand curves. If all we observe are the prices and quantities at these intersections -even if, because of random shocks, these are not constant -how can we learn the shape of the supply and demand curves? If we happen to know that supply (say, of corn) depends on weather, as well as price, and demand depends on income, as well as price, and if weather and income are themselves variable, then variations in weather will shift the supply curve independently, tracing out the demand curve, and variations in income will shift the demand curve, tracing out the supply curve. In the argot of econometrics, the supply and demand curves are identified conditional on the restrictions that weather does not appear in the demand curve and income does not appear in the supply curve.
How -aside from common sense -do we justify these identifying restrictions?
Haavelmo and later the Cowles Commission (Koopmans 1950 and Hood and Koopmans 1953) was essentially a reaction to the billiard-ball causality of the macroeconometric models, motivated by the desire to place intentional agents into empirical macroeconomics.
One reaction to the Lucas critique was to apply the representative-agent model to aggregate data. The optimization problem of the representative agent implies a set of restrictions -more complicated than the exclusion restrictions typically employed in earlier econometric models -that identify the equations of the optimization problem itself. This is an ideological response in the sense that, even within the terms of the individual intentionality of microeconomic theory, we know that aggregates do not conform to relationships that mimic, on a larger scale, microeconomic relationships (see section 1).
What is more, if we take the representative-agent models seriously, then they imply more restrictions on the data than are needed for identification, and such overidentifying restrictions can be tested. For the most part, estimates using actual data reject the overidentifying restrictions. This would come as no surprise to Mill. And one camp of modern macroeconomists have adopted the Millian response of privileging a priori economic theory. The calibration methodology of Prescott (1982, 1991) starts with economic theory and supplies values to key parameters of both the systematic and random components, and then simulates the model. The output of the models is then compared to the statistical characteristics of the actual data.
The calibration methodology has substantially more modest goals than the earlier macroeconometric methodologies. It is not generally used to explain or to predict the The behavior of aggregates is driven both by the constraints of constitutive rules and by the collective intentionality of individual agents. Here I equivocate on "collective," taking it both to refer to Searle's "we believe" and "we intend" and to the straightforward aggregation of the decisions guided by the intentional states of individual agents. The first sense helps to make aggregates different in kind from their microeconomic analogues; the second confirms the insight of the microfoundationalists that individual intentions do matter to aggregate behavior. I do not see any way that we can know a priori how to strike the balance between the relevance of individual intentions and constraints of collective intention. This is a question for empirical research in macroeconomics.
In 
The Irony of Ideology
Reductionism in physical and life sciences faces a number of challenges. There are causally significant macro features of the world that do not seem to depend on the details of the underlying micro arrangements. Reductionism in economics faces a similar challenge, albeit with additional complications. Economics is an intentional science.
Whereas physical and life sciences fear anthropomorphic, teleological, or intentional explanations, economics would be denatured without them. As a human science, it demands that observed behavior be connected to goals, choice, and other intentional states. Economists are skeptical of billiard-ball causation because it omits the human side of human agents and their behavior. Recent economics embraces the program of "Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics" 34 microfoundations, which denies the independent existence of macroeconomic quantities.
The challenge for any anti-reductionist macroeconomics is to provide an account that both assigns an independent ontological status to microeconomic individuals and to macroeconomic aggregates and provides an intelligible account of the connection between the intentional states of the individuals and the behavior of the aggregates.
We have argued that Searle's (1995) 
